What if? “Strategic Competition” vs. “Selective Cooperation”

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April 2025 Central Arctic Ocean Roundtable event at Tongji University. Photo: Min Pan

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A prominent Western narrative portrays China as eagerly pursuing economic and strategic goals in the Arctic. U.S. Defense Department documents refer to this specter as “strategic competition.”¹⁾Office of the Undersecretary for Defense Policy (2019) Report to Congress: Department of Defense Arctic strategy. U.S. Department of Defense. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jun/06/2002141657/-1/-1/1/2019-DOD-ARCTIC-STRATEGY.PDF. Accessed on 28 May 2025 The other Arctic states that are also part of NATO appear similarly concerned.²⁾Andersson P (2024) The recent backlash against China in the Nordic Arctic: prospects for future Chinese engagement in the region. Brief No. 5 2024. Swedish National China Centre. https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/other-publications/the-recent-backlash-against-china-in-the-nordic-arctic-prospects-for-future-chinese-engagement-in-the-region.pdf. Accessed on 28 May 2025 While outside the scope of this article, Russia too may be wary of greater Chinese influence in a part of the world central to Russia’s economy and national defense.

Here, we will focus on the relationship between China and the “Arctic 7” (Canada, Greenland, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States) and, perhaps more importantly, on the respective perceptions of that relationship. We will also consider an alternative narrative of “selective cooperation” and what that could mean for China and the Arctic 7. Perception can become reality, and it is worthwhile to consider whether a different perception of China’s role in the Arctic could lead to a different reality than one of increased competition and confrontation.

There appears to be some evidence supporting the “strategic competition” narrative. China’s Belt and Road Initiative includes the Polar Silk Road, a network of routes and infrastructure connecting Asia and Europe, especially via the Northern Sea Route.³⁾Zreik M & Derendiaeva O. (2025) The Polar Silk Road: China’s strategic engagement and its implications for Arctic governance. Polar Geography 1-21. https://doi.org/10.1080/1088937X.2025.2477000 In addition to ship traffic, the Polar Silk Road at its most expansive includes a north-south rail line in Finland, port facilities in Norway, and river and rail links in Russia. By any measure, the Polar Silk Road would be an enormous economic undertaking, involving many countries and industries, with an expected payoff to match. China’s geopolitical influence would presumably be enhanced as well.

In addition to the Polar Silk Road, China has explored investing in airports in Greenland as well as in a natural gas pipeline in Alaska. Despite initial enthusiasm, Greenland and the U.S. both became wary of increased Chinese influence, and the proposed deals have amounted to nothing. China’s interest in mining in Greenland has likewise fallen short of its ambitions, due both to Greenlandic opposition to mining in general and to American resistance to China gaining a foothold in what the U.S. sees more and more as a place of great geostrategic significance.

China has also pursued a number of smaller initiatives that nonetheless have raised questions about its intentions. The Aurora Institute in Iceland and the Yellow River Station in Ny Ålesund, Svalbard, are scientific ventures, but they have been subject to speculation about ulterior motives. Similarly, China’s icebreakers and their research cruises in the Arctic Ocean are often cast as “dual purpose” missions, combining scientific inquiry with military-oriented surveillance and training.⁴⁾Grady J (2024) Chinese Arctic research expeditions inform military, economic goals, say experts. USNI News, December 12, 2024. U.S. Naval Institute. https://news.usni.org/2024/12/12/chinese-arctic-research-expeditions-inform-military-economic-goals-say-experts. Accessed on 28 May 2025

China’s words have also drawn scrutiny and some degree of criticism. Although its 2018 Arctic Policy is relatively benign, emphasizing cooperation and respect for territorial sovereignty as well as Arctic Indigenous Peoples, China’s self-description as a “near-Arctic state” has not been appreciated by at least some Arctic states. The U.S. in particular has ridiculed China for this self-assigned category, insisting instead that there are only Arctic states and non-Arctic states.⁵⁾Pompeo MR (2019) Looking North: sharpening America’s Arctic focus. May 6, 2019, Rovaniemi, Finland. https://2017-2021.state.gov/looking-north-sharpening-americas-arctic-focus/. Accessed on 28 May 2025

Finally, there is the question of military activity, especially in cooperation with Russia. China and Russia have worked together in northern waters, and Chinese warships have approached U.S. waters around Alaska. The military capabilities of both China and Russia are of concern to the Arctic 7, especially in light of Russia’s increase in military activity and infrastructure in its Arctic region. Strategic competition is one thing, but the flexing of military muscles is a major escalation in tension.

A common theme through all of these examples is the degree to which the prevailing narrative of strategic competition influences the perception of Chinese activity. The Polar Silk Road is indeed ambitious, but the vast majority of the proposed developments exist only on paper and are now rarely mentioned at all.⁶⁾Lamazhapov E, Stensdal I, & Heggelund G (2023) China’s Polar Silk Road: long game or failed strategy? November 14, 2023, The Arctic Institute, https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/china-polar-silk-road-long-game-failed-strategy/. Accessed on 28 May 2025 Indeed, a recent study finds that the scale of China’s investment in the Arctic is far smaller than generally perceived in the West.⁷⁾Edstrom AC, Hauksdottir GRTh, & Lackenbauer PW (2025) Cutting through narratives on Chinese Arctic investments. Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/china-arctic-investments. Accessed on 16 August 2025

As another example, many countries have research stations in Svalbard, but somehow India’s Himadri Station attracts far less attention than the Yellow River Station. China’s research vessel Xue Long conducts scientific expeditions in the Arctic, focusing on climate-change monitoring and ecosystem studies, but again its activity attracts far more attention than Japanese, Korean, or German vessels. China’s idea of its status as a near-Arctic state is that the Arctic is geographically close to China, and climate change in the region has significant implications for the country. China is willing to cooperate with Arctic nations to jointly address the challenges of climate change. Despite (mis)interpretations by others, China’s use of the term “near-Arctic” can also simply mean that China wishes to be a good neighbor. Military activities and ambitions cannot and should not be easily dismissed, but it is also worth noting that increased attention to the Arctic is not one-sided, as NATO has undertaken various exercises in the North Atlantic and the Arctic.

We do not pretend to have insight into the mindset of China’s leaders (nor the mindsets of the leaders of the Arctic 7). It is entirely possible that the darkest interpretations made by the Arctic 7 do in fact represent at least some of what China seeks in the Arctic. But it is also important to consider other evidence that may suggest that a different narrative is also possible. The fact that a coherent narrative exists does not make it true, any more than stating the idea of strategic competition proves it to be accurate.

On paper, there is little to distinguish China’s Arctic Policy from similar policies issued by Japan, South Korea, and several other countries. Words, however, are cheap, and it is reasonable to ask whether China’s actions match its stated policy and its emphasis on cooperation.⁸⁾Su P & Huntington HP (2021) Using critical geopolitical discourse to examine China’s engagement in Arctic affairs. Territory, Politics, Governance 11(3), 590-607. https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2021.1875035 Since 2013, China has been an observer at the Arctic Council. This designation gives China (and other observer states and organizations) the right to attend Arctic Council events, but not to participate in discussions about Council policies or activities. Nonetheless, China has increasingly contributed to projects undertaken by Arctic Council working groups.⁹⁾Arctic Council (2025a) People’s Republic of China. https://arctic-council.org/about/observers/peoples-republic-of-china/. Accessed on 28 May 2025. Similarly, China participates in the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) and other circumpolar research bodies, helping conduct and guide Arctic research.

China has a larger role in the 2018 Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) Fisheries Agreement. The agreement has 10 parties, all on an equal footing, unlike the Arctic Council. The parties include the Arctic coastal states of Canada, Greenland/Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the U.S., as well as China, Iceland, Japan, Korea, and the European Union. China had to overcome some concern that the agreement was intended to benefit Arctic coastal states at the expense of distant-water fishing nations, so joining the agreement was not without some at least modest cost to China.¹⁰⁾Zou L & Huntington HP (2017) Implications of the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea for the management of fisheries in the central Arctic Ocean. Marine Policy 88, 132-138. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2017.11.019 At the same time, China was recognized as an important part of Arctic governance. The agreement also calls for an extensive research and monitoring program, which China has been active in developing, including inviting non-Chinese scientists to join its upcoming research cruises in the Arctic.

China’s economic activities in the Arctic have followed international business norms, again consistent with its Arctic Policy. These activities include making use of the Northern Sea Route and investing in and receiving exports from the Yamal Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) facility in northern Russia.¹¹⁾Deng Y (2019) Petro China CNOOC has joined hands again and is planning to take a stake in the Arctic LNG Project at the same time. [In Chinese]. http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2019-04-26/doc-ihvhiqax5227531.shtml. Accessed on 28 May 2025 These activities are hardly exceptional. European shipping companies had used the Northern Sea Route until the Ukraine war led to economic sanctions on Russia. France had been a major investor in the Yamal plant, until the imposition of sanctions. South Korea constructed the tankers used to carry the LNG to Asian ports. In other words, there is little on the surface at least to distinguish China’s course of action from that of other Arctic and non-Arctic states.

Because other factors also influence the relationships between China and the Arctic 7, we cannot expect China to be welcomed with open arms into all Arctic matters. Disagreements about trade, human rights, and more continue to dampen various forms of interaction between China and others. Nonetheless, the available evidence also supports an alternative narrative of China’s Arctic ambitions and the path to which they could lead, noted earlier as “selective cooperation.”

In some ways, selective cooperation is already occurring, as shown in the Arctic Council and CAO Fisheries Agreement examples. While the Arctic Council has minimized Russian involvement since the start of the war in Ukraine, the work of the fisheries agreement has continued with remarkably little disruption. It is a minor case but suggests the possibility of some form of “Arctic exceptionalism” may be possible, in which Arctic affairs are decoupled from global affairs.¹²⁾Pan M & Huntington HP (2024) China-U.S. cooperation in the Arctic Ocean: prospects for a new Arctic Exceptionalism? Marine Policy 168:106294. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2024.106294

If we pursue the selective cooperation narrative further, the obvious question is how China and the Arctic 7 might build on their admittedly limited cooperation at present. We suggest a few modest ideas here for places to start, and welcome readers to consider how they might suggest that cooperation could be further explored. We do not expect that further cases of cooperation will reduce the sense of strategic competition, at least in the short term, but we hope that trying a different approach could in fact help shift perceptions and lead to a different outcome than one based on fear and mistrust.

“Science diplomacy” remains a viable way for countries to cooperate even amid other tensions. The International Space Station is one example. Antarctic research is another, as is Arctic research. IASC enjoys a general sense of cooperation. Arctic Council projects display more formal collaboration on specific undertakings. Under the CAO Fisheries Agreement, the ten signatories are creating a coordinated research program. As interest in the Arctic continues to grow, these examples provide much to build upon. Scientists and their respective institutions can pursue cooperation in many ways, all of which have the potential to increase mutual understanding and to find common interests.

Similarly, scholarly and cultural exchanges can provide opportunities both for learning and for identifying new opportunities for collaboration. As one example, the CAO Fisheries Agreement calls for the inclusion of Indigenous knowledge in its research and monitoring program, a concept that is relatively new to Chinese researchers but well developed in North America. While the concept of Indigeneity has a very different history in China than in North America, the role of Arctic Indigenous Peoples is important to Canada, Greenland, and the U.S. especially. Chinese scholars can learn from Arctic Indigenous scholars and practitioners to better understand the rich history—and the pitfalls—of academic-Indigenous relations in the Arctic. Exchanges involving young scholars may be similarly productive in creating working relationships and offering new perspectives.

Economic cooperation may be harder in some ways, but diplomatic cooperation may be possible, building on the example of the CAO Fisheries Agreement. Arctic shipping is likely to continue to increase, and parts of the Transpolar Sea Route through the high seas of the Central Arctic Ocean may become commercially viable by mid-century. This route is also subject to hazardous weather and lies far from any form of assistance. Building on the Polar Code of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) is one way to develop governance proactively rather than letting industry practice set the standard. China’s role as a major shipping nation with strong Arctic interests would position it well to take a constructive part in any such effort. A commitment to responsible shipping practices could in turn suggest ways to explore economic cooperation related to commerce, rather than just the exploitation of Arctic resources.

A final point regarding a shift towards selective cooperation is that all those involved need to pay close attention to how their words and actions are interpreted and, at times, misinterpreted. China may believe that its claim to “near-Arctic” status has been misunderstood, but at least some of the burden to correct that misperception lies with China to better explain what it actually means. The U.S. may regard China as a strategic competitor, but it also needs to understand how that designation affects its own perceptions as well as China’s actions in response. In other words, better communication is needed on both sides, along with a willingness to reconsider one’s understanding in order to identify better ways to achieve one’s aims.

While there remain real differences between China and the Arctic 7 (and indeed among the Arctic 7 themselves), they still share many goals such as peaceful relations, sustainable use of Arctic resources, and responsible governance. Whether “strategic competition” accurately captures what is actually happening, it does reflect the perceptions of many on both sides. “Selective cooperation” provides an alternative pathway for achieving those common goals, not least by helping shift perception to allow the possibility of different interpretations of the actions taking place in the Arctic. Different perceptions may lead to different outcomes, so the choice matters.

Min Pan (潘敏) is a professor at School of Political Science and International Relations at Tongji University, People’s Republic of China. Henry P. Huntington is Arctic Science Director at Ocean Conservancy.